

CHICKAMAUGA.

A NEW HISTORY OF THE BATTLE.

CHICKAMAUGA. By John B. Turchin, late Brigadier-General U. S. Army; formerly Colonel of the General Staff in the Imperial Russian Army. Chicago: Fergus Printing Co., 1889. Pp. 320. Price, \$1.00.

General John B. Turchin is one of those foreign soldiers who put their swords and their professional knowledge at the service of the Union at the time of the Rebellion, and whose gallantry and skill were so often distinguished. In the Chickamauga campaign he commanded a brigade in the division of General Reynolds, and during the two days' fight in the Chickamauga Valley he led several desperate and successful charges. In the present volume he has recorded not only his personal recollections of one of the bloodiest battles of the war, but a series of careful observations made during the past twenty years, and fortified by surveys taken on the field of battle, together with verifications by the aid of the official records. It is a book written by a professional soldier of large experience and full knowledge, and while it is in places liable to be charged with prepossession or prejudice, according to the point of view occupied by the reader, the general accuracy of the details and the general weight of the criticism must secure its respectful consideration and cause its really great merits as a historical document to be widely recognized.

The first point of objection likely to be taken against General Turchin's history of Chickamauga is his view of the relations of General Rosecrans to it. His attitude is that of a staunch advocate and defender of that commander, and it is apt to be complained that in attempting to justify this position he passes too lightly over events and dispositions which have been regarded by many military critics as fatal to the theory of Rosecrans's capacity. It is somewhat curious that General Turchin makes no reference to the Comte de Paris's account of this campaign. Grant's opinion, however, is only to disparage it. But the Comte de Paris has so marshalled his views as to constitute an arraignment of Rosecrans in the Chickamauga campaign which, whether just or not, is serious enough to demand specific justification. His account of the second day, and particularly that of the magnificent defense of Horseshoe Ridge, is of the deepest interest, and singularly free from the technicalities which are so apt to confuse the non-professional reader in books written by trained soldiers. He criticizes the action which led to the capture of the 23d Michigan, the 89th Ohio, and part of the 21st Ohio Regiments; severely, and with apparent justice; though, perhaps, more allowance should be made for the prevailing confusion and increasing darkness at the time when the troops were withdrawn from the Ridge. It is his opinion, however, that "this episode was the most shameful that happened during the battle of Chickamauga," and that "there was no occasion whatever for the sacrifice of those fine regiments." They could have withdrawn just as easily as did Steadman's or Brannan's troops.

In his examination of the results and character of the action at Chickamauga, General Turchin reaches the conclusion that it cannot be considered a rebel victory. It is certain that Bragg took no advantage from the battle. Chattanooga, which he was fighting to recapture, remained in the hands of the Federal troops. The Army of Tennessee was so roughly handled that its efficiency was paralyzed. Its losses were greater than those of the Union army. The latter withdrew from a position which was not essential to it, and took up another which Bragg found unassailable, and upon which the Northern troops completed their defeat of the rebels, the ground for which was laid in the Chickamauga Valley. Bragg was very much worse off after the battle than before it. His strength was diminished by 20,000 men, and the spirit of his best troops was demoralized by their failure to carry the Horseshoe Ridge. All that had been done was to occupy positions from which the Union forces had not been driven, but had retired. It was, in fact, a drawn battle, with all the resulting consequences in favor of the Union army. General Turchin adds to his narrative a chapter of criticism in which he makes several obvious sound and practical suggestions. Is an appendix he gives various official documents relating to the battle, and a complete record of the troops engaged in it. An admirable index and eight fine maps complete the usefulness of a volume which is a most important contribution to the literature of the rebellion, and a careful and intelligent study of an action which has been the theme of controversy ever since it took place. All who read this work will be pleased to learn that the author contemplates the speedy publication of a similar full and authoritative history of the battle of Missionary Ridge, in which the Army of the Cumberland conclusively demonstrated that the bloody work of Chickamauga had not demoralized it, as General Grant apprehended.

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General Turchin points out Bragg's mistake clearly. The attempt to conquer the Ridge, he says, was a wasteful blunder. The Federal line was not only attenuated; it was disconnected; and had the Confederate corps been massed upon its weakest point they could have penetrated it easily, have cut the army in two, and have probably rolled up the divided parts in hopeless confusion and defeat. If this is true, however, what can be said for the dispositions presenting so perilous a weakness, and how can Rosecrans be acquitted of accountability for the error of the formation? The commander who fights a defensive battle must provide for every contingency beforehand. The assailant, having the advantage of selecting his point and method of attack, may shift his troops here and there, strengthen one of his lines at the expense of another, mass his forces on right, left or centre. He possesses superior mobility, in short. The defender of a position is under more restraint, and, as at Chickamauga, he possesses no reserve, it is the more important that his lines should be concentrated as much as possible. Rosecrans undoubtedly baffled Bragg and confused him by his change of position, but a resourceful commander this change would not have averted a catastrophe to the Union arms on the 20th. Viewing the campaign without prejudice or prepossession, and simply with an eye to the truth, it is difficult to reach any other conclusion than that the military capacity of General Rosecrans failed before this crucial test. With Lee or Stonewall Jackson before him, any one of a score of errors committed by him would have proved fatal—his way provided that he had not been rescued (as he

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Instruction.

THE BROOKLYN HEIGHTS SEMINARY. 39th year. —Boarding and day school for girls will reopen September 23. Students prepared for college and high school. Catalogue sent on application. "I most heartily commend this school under the new management." —Chas. E. West, L. L. D.

Boys and Young Men—Country.

ANDERSON'S CAMP CEDAR.—Summer school for boys. Read and recite. EDWARD D. MONTAGNE, Trenton, N. J.

BACKWARD AND INVALID BOYS.—The undersigned, a physician of long experience, has a special location, adapted for the treatment of such cases. Location under the name of "The Invalids' Home," New-London, Conn.

BAY SHORE, LONG ISLAND.—Summer home for young boys. Recreation and study combined. Address: Mrs. J. W. WELCH.

BORDENTOWN, N. J. MILITARY INSTITUTE. Rev. T. H. LINDON, A. M., Principal. Circulars sent on application.

ELKWOOD SCHOOL FOR BOYS.—At Milford, Conn. Parents who are unfortunate in the management of their sons will do well to send them to the school offered by this school. W. A. LILLIAMSON, New-London, Conn.

FIREHOLD INSTITUTE. Freehold, N. J. 45th year. Circulars sent on application. Business, high school and college preparation a specialty. Address: J. H. BROWN, Freehold, N. J.

IRVING INSTITUTE. Tarrytown-on-Hudson, offers no special advantage to parents seeking the best instruction for their boys. Address: A. A. MAGNAN, P. D.

NEW-YORK MILITARY ACADEMY.—Commencement, September 17th. Circulars upon application.

PENNSYLVANIA MILITARY ACADEMY. CHESTER, Pa. H. H. HARRIS, A. M., Principal. Circulars sent on application.

SUMMER SCHOOL. For ten boys. White Plains, N. Y. Circulars sent on application.

SUMMER SCHOOL AT VILLIARD. PLEASANT VALLEY, N. Y. Circulars sent on application.

SUMMER SCHOOL FOR BOYS. NEW-YORK, N. Y. Circulars sent on application.

THE SUMMER SCHOOL FOR BOYS. The Perkins School, 100 West 11th St., New York, N. Y. Circulars sent on application.

THE PERKINS MILITARY ACADEMY. PERKINS, N. Y. Circulars sent on application.

FOR SALE.—Royal Day School, in a city near New York. Address: J. H. BROWN, New York, N. Y.

For Both Sexes—Country.

CIRCULARS. Schools, both sexes, city and country. Circulars sent on application.

ROCKLAND COLLEGE. Nyack-on-the-Hudson. Open for summer session. Address: J. H. BROWN, New York, N. Y.

Miscellaneous.

FOR SALE.—Royal Day School, in a city near New York. Address: J. H. BROWN, New York, N. Y.

Teachers.

A—TUTORS. Government, Professors, Teachers, all ranks, and all subjects. Circulars sent on application.

AMERICAN AND FOREIGN TEACHERS. Circulars sent on application.

A—BEST TEACHERS. supplied, no charge. Teachers wanted for all subjects. Circulars sent on application.

B—ROCKWELL'S TEACHERS' AGENCY. (formerly called "The Teachers' Agency") 100 West 11th St., New York, N. Y. Circulars sent on application.

FOR SEPTEMBER.—Ladies' Normal Graduate, wanted. Address: J. H. BROWN, New York, N. Y.

THE UNION TEACHERS' AGENCY. (Established 1860) provides schools with teachers, teachers with positions. W. D. KERR, 100 West 11th St., New York, N. Y.

WANTED.—A person well acquainted with printing, book binding, and all the details of the business, to take charge of the printing and book binding business of the Union Teachers' Agency. Address: J. H. BROWN, New York, N. Y.

WOMAN'S EXCHANGE TEACHERS' BUREAU. Circulars sent on application.

GOVERNOR'S ISLAND, N. Y. April 15, 1889. —Sealed proposals, in triplicate, subject to usual conditions, will be received until 10 a. m. May 15, 1889, for the construction of a new building on Governor's Island, N. Y. Circulars sent on application.

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THE MARKETS.

TOTAL RECEIPTS OF PRODUCE.

Per North River, Vessels and Railroads.

Wheat	113,000 bush.	28,000 bush.	329
Barley	1,100 bush.	1,100 bush.	110
Oats	2,800 bush.	2,800 bush.	280
Rye	1,100 bush.	1,100 bush.	110
Indian	1,100 bush.	1,100 bush.	110
Corn	1,100 bush.	1,100 bush.	110
Flour	1,100 bush.	1,100 bush.	110
Wheat	1,100 bush.	1,100 bush.	110
Barley	1,100 bush.	1,100 bush.	110
Oats	1,100 bush.	1,100 bush.	110
Rye	1,100 bush.	1,100 bush.	110
Indian	1,100 bush.	1,100 bush.	110
Corn	1		